

Chapter 3

Individual Sources of Legitimacy Beliefs: Theory and Data

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As previous chapters have established, legitimacy beliefs among citizens are central to the functioning of global governance institutions (GGIs).¹ It matters significantly for the viability and effectiveness of a political body that citizens believe that its authority is appropriately exercised (Weber 1922/1978; Suchman 1995). Contemporary history shows that this general point for governance arrangements is applicable also to GGIs (cf. Steffek 2004; Tallberg and Zürn 2017).

Now that Part One has set the broad scene of this book – addressing overall themes and the overarching concept of legitimacy itself – Part Two turns more specifically to sources of legitimacy beliefs. A key aspect of understanding the legitimacy of GGIs is to identify the sources of these beliefs: that is, the circumstances in which citizens regard a GGI's authority to be appropriate and desirable. The present chapter focuses on sources of legitimacy that lie with the individual citizens who make the legitimacy judgements and constitute GGIs' audiences, i.e. individual sources. What individual features of a make citizens more or less likely to consider GGIs legitimate? The following two chapters then consider grounds of legitimacy that

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arise from GGIs themselves (institutional features) and the societies in which citizens and institutions are embedded (social structural sources).

To this end, the chapter develops an agenda for exploring the predispositions of individuals that favor or inhibit the development of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs. The chapter reviews relevant existing literature in social psychology, comparative politics, and international relations (IR). While not all of these works refer explicitly to ‘legitimacy beliefs,’ they often invoke closely related relevant concepts such as ‘diffuse support’ or ‘confidence’.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section prepares the ground for the subsequent discussion on individual sources of legitimacy beliefs by reviewing how such legitimacy beliefs are commonly conceptualized and measured in existing literature. What challenges confront the measurement of legitimacy beliefs? The section concludes that evidence from existing cross-national data sets is severely limited. Such data sets tend to provide only single-item measures concerning the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). Little comparable data is available on legitimacy beliefs across different types of GGIs, across issue-areas, across world regions, across countries, across social groups (i.e. that would allow to compare the beliefs held by citizens and specific elite groups), and over time. The section concludes with a discussion of how such shortcomings in data can be addressed.

The second section engages with the core purpose of the chapter: exploring individual-level explanations for variation in citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. The section focuses on five types of such explanations found in the existing literature: namely, political knowledge, utilitarian appraisals, social identity, values, and susceptibility to political communication. This survey shows how existing theories draw on, and sometimes combine, insights from social psychology, comparative politics, and IR. The section identifies several promising individual-level explanations, but also concludes that the scope of most arguments remains unclear, as few

studies engage in comparative inquiries of the individual drivers of legitimacy beliefs across GGIs, issue-areas, world regions, countries, social groups, and time.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the chapter's message in three key points. First, future research on the legitimacy of GGIs could usefully draw on the rich literature in social psychology and comparative politics regarding public opinion towards domestic political institutions (cf. Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Tyler 2006). Second, as also argued in the preceding chapter, more systematic inquiries are needed to explain variation in legitimacy beliefs across GGIs, issue-areas, world regions, countries, social groups, and time. Third, explanations of legitimacy beliefs can be advanced by (a) including a broader range of questions that tap legitimacy beliefs in existing large-scale cross-national surveys, and (b) using survey experiments.

Conceptualization and Measurement of Legitimacy Beliefs

As a first step in developing an agenda for exploring individual-level explanations of legitimacy beliefs, this section discusses challenges and possibilities in conceptualizing and measuring citizens' legitimacy beliefs as such. This question has been contentious since the first research on legitimacy perceptions vis-à-vis the EU (e.g., Merritt and Puchala 1968; Dalton and Duval 1986). The establishment of a liberal trade program for Europe in the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 further spurred interest in public perceptions of the EU's legitimacy. Increased data collection on the EU through the Eurobarometer surveys (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011: 8) and on other GGIs through the World Values Survey (WVS) enabled the first survey data analyses on legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis the EU and other GGIs (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Norris 2000).

This early survey work generated some interesting findings. For example, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) had previously diagnosed a state of ‘permissive consensus’ among European citizens that enabled elites to promote European integration largely unconstrained by public pressure. In contrast, Eichenberg and Dalton twenty years later drew on Eurobarometer data to argue that the ‘conventional wisdom...that European citizens merely provided a ‘permissive consensus’ no longer applies, as ‘public opinion is exercising a growing influence on national policymakers and on the institutions of the EC itself’ (1993: 507-8). More recently, survey data have led scholars to conclude that the EU faces a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), whereby national identities and ideologies may limit EU policy-makers’ room for maneuver.

Conceptualization

Public opinion research on legitimacy beliefs draws upon, and bridges, social psychology and political systems theory. Most of the literature on the EU’s legitimacy has focused on ‘public support’ for European integration, building on early contributions in systems theory about ‘diffuse support’ and ‘specific support’) as well as studies of political institutions in the United States (Easton 1965, 1975; Tanenhaus and Murphy 1981; Caldeira and Gibson 1992).

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) define public support as a political ‘attitude’, thereby linking the study of public support to probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in social psychology, where ‘attitude’ is commonly defined as an evaluative judgment about a stimulus object (cf. Eagly and Shelly 1993: 1). More recent studies have explored public support for GGIs other than the EU, such as the UN (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016), international economic institutions (Edwards 2009), and international courts (Voeten 2013; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016).

Other proxies for legitimacy are ‘trust’ (e.g., Torgler 2008; Zmerli 2010) and ‘confidence’ (e.g., Norris 2000; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). These two terms have been developed in a large literature on political trust in the domestic context (e.g., Uslaner 2002; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011) and are well anchored in system theory (e.g., Easton 1975). For Easton, trust or confidence (which he uses as synonyms) arises when people expect that ‘the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if ... the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny’, (Easton 1975: 447). Here ‘outcomes’ may refer to the procedures, the polity, and the performance of a political system, while preferences may relate to an individual’s self-interests as well as altruistic interests. This understanding of trust or confidence has informed much research on the sociological legitimacy of GGIs (Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Tallberg et al., this volume). However, others advocate to exclude narrow self-interest as a component of confidence in sociological legitimacy (Agné, this volume).

To study legitimacy beliefs empirically, scholars typically use different measures of support as indicators for legitimacy (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Dellmuth and Chalmers 2017; Mau 2005; Rohrschneider 2002; for an overview, see Westle 2007; but see Karp et al. 2003: 276, who view support as a precondition for European institutions to build legitimacy). Others use trust (Harteveld et al. 2013: 543) or confidence (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015: 461) as empirical measures for legitimacy as a theoretical concept. In sum, the existing public opinion literature typically studies legitimacy through indicators of confidence, trust, and support. The next section examines the concrete survey data that is available to measure these indicators.

Measurement

Several cross-national survey data sets include measures of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs. However, these data sets are scattered across institutions and geographical areas and also have significant gaps in the operationalization of central concepts.

To begin with, the WVS has in recent waves asked questions about people's confidence in GGIs. Table 3.1 lists all GGIs included in different data collection waves of the WVS. The overview distinguishes between GGIs active in four broad issue-areas: economic affairs, security, regional integration, and multi-issue global cooperation.

[Table 3.1 about here]

While the WVS enables comparative research across institutions, there are important limitations. Table 3.1 illustrates that the included GGIs are almost exclusively regional organizations, which means that questions about confidence in a GGI are asked in disparate and non-comparable country samples. The WVS covers only a few GGIs with a global membership, in the sense of including member states from more than one world region: namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN.

In terms of the number of countries in which questions about these GGIs were asked, more encompassing public opinion data is available on the UN than on any other global institution and on the EU than on any other regional institution (see Figure 3.1). The black lines in Figure 3.1 depict the yearly variation in included countries, whereas the grey spikes show the total number of countries included in the four-year waves.

[Figure 3.1 about here]

Next to the WVS, a number of other cross-national surveys provide opportunities for comparative analysis of legitimacy beliefs. Table 3.2 shows years when regional survey series (such as the Asian Barometer, Afrobarometer, and Eurobarometer, as well as the global Gallup Voice of the People series) have included measures of legitimacy beliefs. (Table 3.2 does not include the many questions that have been used to measure public support for the EU, since these questions do not include items on other GGIs.) However, questions measuring legitimacy beliefs are typically not asked in all member states of a GGI, and the data are fragmented across disparate regional samples. In particular, questions about regional governance organizations are usually only asked in the member states of these institutions. Exceptions are questions about the EU in the Afrobarometer and Gallup surveys. Additional problems for comparability arise when the wordings of questions and the categories of answers change within and across survey series.

Another issue pertains to the specific measures used to tap legitimacy. As Table 3.2 shows, most questions refer to ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ in GGIs, which as indicated earlier are conventional indicators of legitimacy beliefs. However, it becomes more problematic when the Eurobarometer asks whether people think that their country’s membership of the EU is ‘a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing’. Although this question may capture legitimacy beliefs to some extent, it may also lead people to think about the benefits of membership, which relates to specific rather than diffuse support (see also Agné, this volume). Similar problems arise with questions in the Afrobarometer about a country’s say in, and benefits from, GGIs. Meanwhile Gallup includes questions about whether people have ‘a positive, negative, or neutral opinion’ of GGIs, which is problematic since, like the Eurobarometer formulation, it may push people to indicate specific rather than diffuse support. Respondents may think that they need to relate their answers to an opinion about specific aspects of GGIs, such as policy, procedure or issue area.

[Table 3.2 about here]

Existing data sets are also of limited value in studying the temporal evolution of legitimacy beliefs, an issue which merits more attention (Niedermeyer and Sinnott 1995: 5). A rare exception is the biennial European Social Survey (ESS), which has since 2002 included questions about trust in the European Parliament and the UN. To date, almost no studies have examined how far transformations in legitimacy beliefs in GGIs may be explained by factors such as policy change, changes in elite discourse, or triggering events such as global crises or natural disasters. Moreover, the few available analyses of this kind relate only to the EU, looking at the effects on legitimacy of policy change (Dellmuth and Chalmers 2017), elite communication (Gabel and Scheve 2007a), and economic crises (Braun and Tausendpfund 2014).

The limited data on GGIs other than the EU means that longitudinal analyses of developments in legitimacy beliefs for a world-wide sample of countries are difficult to realize. In the WVS, data across four or five waves are only available for four GGIs (see Figure 3.2): the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the UN. The lack of over-time studies of legitimacy beliefs is a clear gap in the existing literature, as only longitudinal analyses can tell if legitimacy beliefs have changed over time and if existing explanations for legitimacy hold across time periods.

[Figure 3.2 about here]

Given these limitations of existing survey data, how should researchers wishing to study legitimacy beliefs move forward? First, it would benefit cumulative research to have more

systematic inclusion of legitimacy measures across existing large-scale surveys and a more systematic coverage of countries in these surveys. Such a move toward systematization would greatly facilitate comparability of data across and within surveys. To the extent that surveys would also include several measures of legitimacy beliefs, this would make it possible to explore how different legitimacy measures relate to each other (Caldeira and Gibson 1992), and whether existing findings might be driven by the choice of survey measures and their placement in questionnaires.

Second, researchers could study legitimacy beliefs through survey experiments, building on methodological advances in social psychology and comparative politics. Survey experiments have clear advantages in avoiding methodological problems that arise from poor data availability and difficulties to identify causal effects (Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Chong and Druckman 2007; Maier et al. 2012; Mutz 2011; Schuck and de Vreese 2006). Like opinion surveys, survey experiments are administered to randomly selected representative samples of the target population of interest, implying that the results of these studies can be generalized to the overall target population. However, unlike the merely observational data from opinion surveys, survey experiments allow the establishment of causal inferences by subjecting subsamples to different treatments. Such an approach avoids the problems that plague efforts to establish causal inferences from observational data alone (e.g. reverse causality, spurious correlations, selection bias, and multicollinearity). The random assignment of respondents to treatment groups and a control group ensures that the observed treatment effects do not systematically derive from uncontrolled influences.

Survey experiments enable researchers to test theories about the sources of legitimacy beliefs for which there is no data available in existing large-scale opinion surveys. By administering experiments on representative samples of one or several populations, researchers can engage in cross-national comparisons of legitimacy beliefs without relying on cross-

national survey data. This method has been used to study effects on legitimacy beliefs of citizens' susceptibility to elite communication (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2016b) as well as citizens' evaluation of GGIs' institutional qualities (Dellmuth et al. 2017).

In sum, research on legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs confronts challenges in terms of the conceptualization and measurement of such beliefs. While existing studies certainly make choices about definitions, indicators and the like, these methodological decisions are seldom explicitly discussed. Moreover, existing data sets face clear limitations in terms of coverage and comparability. Greater attention to these issues in future research could advance the systematic study of the sources of beliefs in GGI legitimacy.

Individual-Level Explanations of Legitimacy Beliefs

Having set out key framing challenges about conceptualization and measurement, the chapter can turn to its more specific concern with individual-level factors that might help to explain variation in legitimacy beliefs towards GGIs. Over the past two decades, a growing number of scholars have begun to explore individual-level explanations of legitimacy beliefs. These contributions often draw on rich intellectual traditions in political psychology (Tyler 2006), sociology (e.g., Weber 1922/1978), and comparative politics (Easton 1975). Yet, so far, most of these studies have focused on public opinion towards the EU, with only limited attention to other GGIs. This following discussion reviews existing research on five main types of individual-level explanation: i.e. pertaining to political knowledge, utilitarian appraisals, social identity, values, and susceptibility to political communication. By addressing circumstances of the individual who holds the legitimacy beliefs, these explanations are distinct from the institutional and structural sources of legitimacy beliefs that are discussed in the next two chapters.

Political Knowledge

One potential key cognitive factor shaping legitimacy beliefs is political knowledge held by individuals. When correct political information becomes extensive and organized in people's minds, it amounts to what is variously referred to as 'sophistication' (Luskin 1990), 'awareness' (Zaller 1992), 'knowledge' (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and 'cognitive mobilization' (Inglehart 1970). These substantially overlapping concepts all refer to organized cognition (Luskin 1990). Knowledgeable individuals are more likely to be exposed to, and able to process, new political information (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 192–93).

Political knowledge theories have predicted that knowledgeable citizens tend to be more supportive of GGIs. Based on Inglehart's (1970) argument that high levels of cognitive mobilization enable citizens to identify with the European political community, scholars have argued that these circles may find GGIs more familiar and less threatening (cf. Janssen 1991). In addition, more knowledgeable citizens are more usually integrated into transnational networks of communication where people tend to be supportive of multilateral organizations and global governance (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2009: ch. 6), leading to higher levels of support for the EU (Inglehart et al. 1991; Caldeira and Gibson 1995). Evidence also suggests a positive association between political knowledge and support for a number of GGIs: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Caldeira and Gibson 1995), the EU (Anderson 1998), as well as the UN, NAFTA, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the IMF (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2016b). Similarly, Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) shows that awareness affects beliefs in the problem-solving capacity of the EU, the UN, the WTO, the IMF, and the Group of Eight (G8).

However, the direct causal link from political knowledge to legitimacy beliefs is far from settled. Indeed, it remains unclear why all types of information – e.g. about the failings as well

as the benefits of GGIs – should generate greater support (cf. Karp et al. 2003: 275-6). No systematic research exists either about the types of knowledge about GGIs that shape transnational resistance networks, where the focus is on delegitimizing global governance (e.g., Tarrow 2005; Della Porta 2016).

Also in the vein of political knowledge theories is the argument that people's level of political awareness influences the extent to which they make use of heuristics when forming legitimacy beliefs (Karp et al. 2003; Harteveld et al. 2013). This proposition suggests that people with less political knowledge about GGIs are more prone to construct evaluative judgments about GGIs based on the information that they hold about the political institutions they know best (typically domestic bodies). Indeed, convincing evidence indicates that people with more confidence in their domestic government also have more confidence in the EU (e.g., Anderson 1998; Muñoz et al. 2011; Sattler and Urpelainen 2012; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Muñoz 2017), the African Union (AU), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (Schlippak 2015), the UN (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2016b), the World Bank, and the IMF (Johnson 2011).

A recent comparative analysis of the EU, UN, IMF, WTO, and NAFTA confirms the positive association between confidence in domestic and global institutions, and suggests that this relationship is driven both by people's use of heuristics and by an antecedent factor of social trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2016b). In contrast, evidence is not convincing for a 'support transfer', where individuals who do not support domestic political institutions tend to support the EU. The evidence for this latter claim comes only from 1994 and 1995, and the measures for the dependent variables in these analyses tap specific rather than diffuse support (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Kritzing 2003).

We need more studies testing comparatively the linkages between political knowledge and legitimacy beliefs, using survey instruments that draw on the methodological advances in

the political knowledge literature (cf. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Mondak 1999; Dolan 2011). Existing studies rely on self-reported knowledge indicators, where people are typically asked whether they have heard of a particular global institution, which is not a very reliable measure of knowledge. We need more and better data on factual knowledge about a large number of GGIs (Dellmuth 2016).

Ultimately, political knowledge matters because it can enhance a GGI's 'epistemic virtues'. This quality refers to a GGI's ability to interact with its audiences in ways that facilitate critical assessment of the GGI's activities. Buchanan and Keohane (2006) argue that such epistemic virtue is a precondition for a GGI's moral right to rule. Clearly a GGI cannot have a probing critical conversation with its audiences if they are not knowledgeable.

Utilitarian Appraisals

Utilitarian appraisals refer to citizens' judgments about the costs and benefits of GGIs for them personally. In this vein *economic theories* relate legitimacy beliefs to how GGIs impact on an individual's pocketbook, either in terms of personal wellbeing ('ego-tropic considerations') or the relative economic performance of their sub-national region or country ('socio-tropic considerations'). The explanatory power of economic considerations has been theorized and convincingly demonstrated in the context of the EU (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Christin 2005). Economic theories assume that people are affected differentially by globalization, for example, in terms of income levels, vulnerability due to low education and occupational skills, economic performance of home country, or geographical proximity to borders.

In terms of ego-tropic considerations, there is evidence that wealthy EU citizens are more likely to benefit from capital liberalization, since they can exploit the greater investment

opportunities provided by more open financial markets, which leads them to think more favorably of the EU (e.g., Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998c; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) have refined existing theories about ego-tropic considerations by examining how national contexts influence the linkages between self-interested economic considerations and EU legitimacy. Specifically, they show that citizens in less affluent countries are more inclined to evaluate the EU on the basis their own personal economic prospects. In contrast, evidence suggests that individuals in richer countries evaluate the EU chiefly on political criteria such as democracy. Ego-tropic considerations have also been shown to be relevant in the context of legitimacy beliefs towards the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Dissatisfaction with one's household income appears to trigger negative attitudes towards these international economic institutions (Edwards 2009).

In terms of socio-tropic considerations, survey evidence suggests that people from wealthier countries that are net contributors to the UN budget are less supportive of the UN (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). In the context of the EU, research suggests that the net contributors to the EU budget are less supportive for the regional institution than the net beneficiaries (e.g., Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Karp et al. 2003; Hartevelde et al. 2013). However, not all studies find evidence of such a link (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010). Moreover, research that demonstrates an effect of net benefits from the EU's budget on public support for the EU usually does not theorize this link. That is, this work fails to demonstrate how the specific types of funding that constitute these net transfers are relevant to individual citizens. Indeed, recent research shows that European spending only increases support for the EU in the case of redistributive spending that creates clear winners and losers, which makes EU spending visible even among the less politically knowledgeable. Such supranational spending generates more supportive attitudes among those who perceive themselves as 'winners' of needs-based spending (Dellmuth and Chalmers 2017).

There is also evidence that the effect of EU spending on support for the EU is stronger among the politically aware and those who have a European identity (Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015). In the context of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, Edwards (2009: 194) has examined both ego-tropic and socio-tropic considerations. He shows that, while a ‘bad (and deteriorating) situation, both for the nation as well as individuals, implies a greater sensitivity to the distributional effects of the [international economic institutions],’, pocketbook explanations have more explanatory power than socio-tropic considerations.

Social Identity

A third strand of research on individual-level sources of legitimacy highlights the effects of social identity on support for and confidence in GGIs. These theories conceive of identities as relatively stable predispositions formed early in life through socialization and interactions with family, friends, neighbors, and teachers (Norris and Inglehart 2009: ch. 6). *Identity theories* of legitimacy have especially addressed the multilevel polity of the EU, where evidence suggests that people have overlapping identities (Risse 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005),

From this perspective, a person’s local, regional, national, and European identities shape how they view the EU. Individuals with more broadly inclusive European identities tend to feel less threatened by regional integration processes and are hence more supportive of the EU than individuals with entrenched national or other exclusive identities (e.g., Carey 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015). For example, Hartevelde et al. (2013: 548) show how identity can ‘function as a buffer against more short-term notions, such as (perceived) costs and benefits’ related to the economic impact of EU integration. Indeed, indicators of European identity typically have more explanatory power than indicators of material self-interest or socio-tropic considerations when

explaining support for the EU (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005; Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015). There is also evidence for such a link in the context of the UN, where people who identify with a world community are more positively predisposed towards the UN (Furia 2005; Norris 2000; Torgler 2008; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

Values

Values theories focus on how a person's norms and moral beliefs shape their attitudes towards political institutions. The boundaries of the concepts 'attitude' and 'values' in this literature often blur. Values are commonly defined as standards or criteria for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes towards relevant objects (Rokeach 1968: 160).

In the case of global governance, literature concerning values has usually focused more specifically on cosmopolitanism as a worldview. Broadly speaking, cosmopolitans associate their identity with humanity as a whole, adhere to universal ethics, and hold open attitudes towards people from other places and cultures. Such values of globalism, universalism and humanism may, in turn, shape attitudes towards GGIs (cf. Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012), and are prevalent across social groups and countries regardless of their affluence (Furia 2005). The existing public opinion literature emphasizes two main causal mechanisms linking cosmopolitan values and legitimacy beliefs in GGIs. First, citizens identifying with a global community may be more likely to be exposed to information about GGIs and more positively predisposed toward that information (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth 2016). Second, as cosmopolitans treat humanity as a whole as a relevant identity group, they feel concrete moral and political obligations from this identification (Furia 2005). In addition, cosmopolitans may be more likely to appreciate GGIs as problem-solvers for transboundary policy challenges affecting all humans (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016).

Values theories have advanced our understanding of individual legitimacy beliefs by discussing causal linkages from values to legitimacy beliefs. Yet studies do not agree on the causal sequence: namely, whether cosmopolitan values precede beliefs in GGI legitimacy; or whether cosmopolitan values result from positive attitudes towards GGIs (Norris 2009: 20). Furthermore, the explanatory power of values other than cosmopolitanism remains unexplored. Moral beliefs and ideologies may shape individuals' attitudes toward global governance, but with the exception of one recent study (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016) they have not been systematically linked to legitimacy beliefs.

Susceptibility to Political Communication

A final type of individual-level explanation of legitimacy beliefs focuses on citizens' susceptibility to political communication. This literature problematizes the assumption that people hold well-formed and enduring attitudes, which they can 'look up' in memory to form their political judgments. Instead, this research suggests that individuals may have relatively loose opinions about political institutions, which make them susceptible to communication about these institutions, as put forward in the early study by Converse (1964). Whether citizens' legitimacy beliefs are more or less easily affected by political communication depends not only on properties of the process of political communication (such as the source, message, and object), but also on characteristics of the recipient of the communication (such as their prior experiences, opinions, and beliefs) (Tyler 2006).

Drawing on social psychology, *elite communication theories* suggest that legitimacy beliefs may be shaped through communication by political parties, civil society organizations, and governments (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007). As elaborated in the next chapters of this volume, political and societal elites often compete in trying to influence citizens' perceptions

of GGIs through legitimation and delegitimation practices. Typical means are press releases, social media, public speeches, and policy papers. This competition is consequential. There is robust evidence that mass publics express more favorable attitudes towards the EU when political elites send a consistent and positive message about European integration. Vice versa, more polarized elites reduce public support for the EU (Gabel and Scheve 2007a, 2007b).

Most of existing research on the effects of elite communication in global governance focuses on the EU, where the evidence is mixed (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). Some studies find support for an impact of elite communication on public support for the EU (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005). Others find that partisan ideology moderates the effect (Maier et al. 2012). Yet others find no effect at all (Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015).

Much less research addresses effects of elite communication beyond the EU. That said, one recent comparative study shows how elite communication shapes people's legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis the UN, IMF, WTO, NAFTA, and EU (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2016a). This research demonstrates that elite communication has greater effects on citizens' legitimacy beliefs when the public perceives the communicating elites to be credible, when messages are negative in tone, and when the communication refers to GGIs with which citizens are more familiar.

The last finding ties in well with theorizing on individual-level predispositions that make citizens more or less susceptible to framing effects (Chong and Druckman 2007). Generally, the literature suggests that citizens are more impressionable when it comes to communication on issues that are less familiar to them, where they have not acquired an information and knowledge base for stable political attitudes. Conversely, framing effects diminish when individuals are more engaged and knowledgeable, making their opinions less open to capture. When citizens are already exposed to a broad array of arguments, they are less affected by biased representations of issues in elite communication (Chong and Druckman 2007; Nicholson

2011; Bechtel et al. 2015). This theoretical expectation has been verified empirically in studies which document the moderating impacts of knowledge and deliberation on the ways that political issues are framed (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Karp et al. 2003).

Taken together, the five types of individual-level studies discussed in this section have enhanced our understanding of the drivers of citizen beliefs in the legitimacy of GGIs. However, most existing work is limited to the EU and advancing this agenda requires wider testing and more comparative analysis.

Conclusion: An Agenda for GGI Legitimacy Scholars

This chapter has reviewed existing literature relevant to individual-level sources of legitimacy beliefs in GGIs. Following a discussion of the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy beliefs per se, the chapter has assessed five types of individual-level explanations: in terms of political knowledge, utilitarian appraisals, social identity, values, and susceptibility to elite communication. This concluding section draws the overall argument together in three steps.

First, better understanding of legitimacy beliefs in global governance will require more engagement with insights from comparative politics and social psychology (cf. Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013). As the review of individual-level explanations has demonstrated, research in comparative politics has been at the forefront in integrating lessons from social psychology. With the exception of research on the EU, IR scholarship lags behind in theorizing the importance of individual-level attributes, such as political knowledge, cosmopolitan identity, and susceptibility to political communication, for the development of legitimacy beliefs.

Second, research on individual-level sources of GGI legitimacy needs more comparative work. Despite a burgeoning literature on individual-level factors that shape attitudes towards the EU, few studies examine other GGIs, and there are almost no comparative assessments of

legitimacy beliefs across GGIs, issue-areas, world regions, countries, social groups, and time. Exploring whether and how individual-level explanations of legitimacy beliefs work similarly or differently in varying GGI contexts is an important task for future research.

Third, insufficient data are currently available for comparative assessments of individual sources of legitimacy beliefs regarding GGIs. To redress this situation, researchers should refine and improve measures of legitimacy beliefs and their covariates in existing large-scale surveys. Work should also draw on the methodological insights from social psychology and comparative politics with respect to survey experiments (Chong and Druckman 2007). Most large-scale surveys currently face limitations in terms of measurement, coverage, and comparability, but such obstacles can be overcome through greater attention to the requirements of comparative legitimacy research. One example is the cooperation between the Legitimacy in Global Governance research program in Sweden and the WVS on a new battery of questions on legitimacy in global governance. In addition, survey experiments constitute an attractive alternative to observational data. This method allows for resource-efficient collection of data that are comparable across GGIs and countries. In addition, survey experiments benefit from the advantages of generalizable population-based samples and the internal validity of experiments (cf. Mutz 2011; Maier et al. 2012; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2016a; Dellmuth et al. 2017).

All told, this discussion of existing evidence about the sources of citizens' legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs shows that these perceptions depend on a range of individual predispositions. While the core of public opinion research on legitimacy beliefs focuses on individual sources, taking theory forward will also require consideration of how individual sources such as instrumental self-interest and social identity are shaped by contextual factors such as the institutional qualities of GGIs (see Scholte and Tallberg, this volume), the social structures in which citizens are embedded (see Scholte, this volume) and the social transmission

of information about GGIs (see Bäckstrand and Söderbaum, this volume). Given the increasing importance of legitimacy beliefs for the viability of GGIs in a time of ever greater politicization of global institutions, the individual sources and circumstances explaining global governance legitimacy beliefs warrant further attention, examining legitimacy beliefs comparatively across GGIs, issue areas, world regions, countries, social groups, and time.

Table 1: Question about confidence in GGIs in the WVS, 1990-2014

Type of GGI ^a	Issue area	Wave 2 (1990-1994) ^b	Wave 3 (1995-1998)	Wave 4 (1999-2004)	Wave 5 (2005-2009)	Wave 6 (2010-2014)
Interstate	Economic affairs		The Free Commerce Treaty	The Free Commerce Treaty	CER, IMF	The Free Commerce Treaty, CER
	Security	NATO		NATO	NATO	
	Regional integration	EU	EU, ASEAN, AU/OAU, NAFTA, The Andean Pact, Mercosur, SAARC, APEC, OAS/OEA	EU, ASEAN, The Arab League, AU/OAU, NAFTA, The Andean Pact, Mercosur, SAARC, ECO, APEC, OAS/OEA, SADC/SADEC, EAC	EU, The Arab League, AU/OAU, NAFTA, Mercosur, APEC, OAS/OEA, CARICOM, CIS	EU, ASEAN, The Arab League, AU/OAU, NAFTA, Mercosur, SAARC, APEC, CARICOM, CIS, UNASUR, AMU, GCC
	Multi-issue		UN	UN	UN	UN, The Organization of the Islamic World
Nonstate	Economic affairs				Banks	Banks

Notes: See www.worldvaluessurvey.org. ^a African Union (AU), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Cooperation Council for the Arab states of Gulf (GCC), Closer Economic Relations (CER), East African Community (EAC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of American States (OAS) or Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), South Asian Association Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Southern African Development Community (SADC/SADEC). Question wording: I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? ^b The confidence question was not included in the first wave from 1981 to 1984.

Table 2: Questions on legitimacy beliefs in regional survey series and global surveys other than the WVS, 1990-2014

GGI^a	Asia Europe Survey^b	Asian Barometer Surveys^c	Afrobarometer^d	Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer^e	European Social Survey^f	Gallup Voice of the People^g	Latinobarometer^h
AU/OAU			2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009			2005	
Andean Pact							2001-2003, 2009-2010
ASEAN	2000						
Banks			2001			2011 ^j	2001, 2010, 2011 ^k
COE				1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003			
EAC			2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009				
ECHR				1999, 2001, 2002, 2003			
ECOWAS			2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009				
EU	2000	Wave 2 (2005-2008)	2002, 2003, 2005	1990-2014	2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 ⁱ	2004, 2005, 2012	2002, 2003
FAO						2011, 2012	
IMF		Wave 2 (2005-2008)	2002, 2003, 2005			2004, 2005	2001-2003, 2009-2011
ICC						2005	
ICJ				1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003			
ISO						2011, 2012	
Mercosur							2001-2003, 2009-2011
NAFTA							
NATO	2000			2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009		2004	
OAS/OEA							2001, 2009-2011
OECD						2004	
OSCE				1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003			
SADC /SADEC			2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009				
SICA							2011
UN	2000	Wave 2 (2005-2008)	2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009	1997, 1999-2014	2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014	2004, 2005, 2005, 2011, 2012, 2013	2001-2003, 2009-2011

UNASUR						2009, 2010
UNESCO				1999, 2000		2011
UNHCR						2011, 2012
UNICEF						2011, 2012
WHO						2005, 2012, 2013
World Bank	2000	Wave 2 (2005-2008)	2002, 2003, 2005	1995, 2001, 2004, 2010		2004, 2005
WTO	2000		2002, 2003, 2005	2001, 2004		2004, 2012
						2002

Notes: ^a Council of Europe (COE), Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Central American Integration System (SICA), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO).

^b The Asian Barometer Surveys (see <http://www.asianbarometer.org>) should not be confused with the Asiabarometer. For each aware of, please let us know about your impression of the following organizations. Here is a scale: 1 means very bad and 10 means very good. [Skip items that the respondent have not heard of.].

^c Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions to operate in the best interests of society. If you don’t know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so. [Trust a lot; Trust to a degree; Don’t really trust; Don’t trust at all; DK]. Some items refer to specific bodies of the such as the European Parliament.

^d See <http://www.afrobarometer.org>. In your opinion, how much des the [GGI] do to help your country, or haven’t you heard enough to say? [Do nothing no help; Help a little bit; Help somewhat; Help a lot; DK]. Giving marks out of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well, how well do you think the following institutions do their Jobs? Or haven’t you heard enough about the institution to have an opinion? [0 ‘very badly’ – 10 ‘very well’; DK].

^e Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. Different question wordings over time. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. [Tend to trust; Tend not to trust; DK]. (if heard of) And, for each of them please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. [Tend to trust; Tend not to trust; DK]. (if heard of) And do you tend to trust it, or not? [Tend to trust; Tend not to trust; DK]. Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union [of the European Community common market] is: a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a good thing? [A good thing; Neither good nor bad; A bad thing; DK; NA].

^f See www.europeansocialsurvey.org. Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [1 ‘no trust at all’ – 10 ‘complete trust’; DK].

^g See <https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/223>. And is your overall opinion of the [organization] positive, neutral or negative? [Positive; Neutral; Negative; DK; Not applicable (NA)]. Do you have a positive (Good), negative (Bad), or neutral (Neither Good nor Bad) opinion of the following international organizations or have you never heard of them?


^h See <http://www.latinobarometro.org/>. The answer categories of this question vary slightly over time: From the list of institutions in the card, please mention all that you know and give it a grade from 1 to 10, being 1 very bad and 10 very good. [10 ‘very good’ – 1 ‘very bad’; DK].

ⁱ This question item deals with “The European Parliament”.

^j Items for this question deal with different banks: Bank of America; Barclays PLC; BNP Paribas; Citigroup; Credit Suisse Group; Deutsche Bank; ING Group; UBS.


^k Items for this question deal with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

Figure 1: Number of countries with confidence question in GGIs in the WVS, 1990-2014



Notes: Author’s own presentation, based on WVS data, waves 2-6. The solid lines depict the number of countries for each year, whereas the grey shades show the number of countries for each wave.

Figure 2: Countries with data for at least four waves in the WVS, 1990-2014



Notes: Author’s own presentation, based on WVS data, waves 2-6. The country abbreviations refer to Argentina (AR), Chile (CL), India (IN), Mexico (MX), Peru (PE), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES), Turkey (TR), and the United States (US).